associated with analyzing stability operations and the impact the current analytical shortfall across the analytical community and their ability to provide meaningful analysis to solve very difficult problems pertaining to force structure, strategy, and a host of other defense challenges. To illustrate these challenges in the analytical community this paper will review several key events that defined the modeling and simulations challenges and will assess a recent study conducted by the Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Analysis Center (TRAC) addressing modeling, methodology, and analytical shortfalls related to stability operations. Finally, the study will recommend for consideration by the analytical community future investment strategies. Commander of the US Army Training and Doctrine Command, stated that "We recognize that in a contemporary operational environment in the 21st Century, conventional military operations, offensive and defensive, will be conducted simultaneously with stability operations." 2 However, this concept is not new given our operational experience of the last several years that has forced the Army to modernize and update its prevailing doctrine, although some critics saw this as a 'little too late'.
THE CHALLENGES OF MODELING AND ANALYZING STABILITY OPERATIONS
During the new release of the cornerstone field manual FM 3-0, Operations, Lieutenant
General William Caldwell touted it as a doctrine that "has a combination of 'evolutionary'
and 'revolutionary' concepts. Much of the doctrine may be evolutionary, while its impact on the force and the application of the doctrine will be revolutionary." 3 He went on to say that the "revolutionary attributes" are that stability operations have been made co-equal to offense and defensive operations, and that stability operations are now a "core mission of the Army" 4 . Again, is this really news, or merely an acknowledgement of current realities as well as a less-than speedy acceptance of yesterday's wars?
In the last three years of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) the Army, at the direction of the Bush Administration, gradually became involved in leading stability operations. Nevertheless, has the Army really changed its perspective on integrating stability concepts in all aspects of the force, or is this yet again part of a pendulum swing towards reluctant acceptance one day and denial and rejection the next? If so, is the Army leadership poised to make this change effective, lasting, and most importantly, for the right reasons? In support of these institutional decisions, is the analytical community poised with the proper tools, data, and methodologies required to support the upcoming decisions on force structure, roles, and missions?
This project analyzes the ongoing debate on how the Army will change to meet the current and projected world environment's challenges in force structure and fighting doctrine. Second, this study will synopsize the significant challenges associated with integrating stability operations into Army doctrine, operations, and force structure. Third, this study will examine the current challenges that the analytical community is now facing associated with analyzing stability operations, and the impact the current analytical shortfall across the analytical community and their ability to provide meaningful analysis to solve very difficult problems pertaining to force structure, strategy, and a host of other defense challenges. To illustrate these challenges in the analytical community this paper will review several key events that defined the modeling and simulations challenges and will assess a recent study conducted by the Army In contrast to the differing views of the "Crusaders", the "Conservatives" like Colonel Gian Gentile complain that "the Army's new counterinsurgency manual, Field
Manual 3-24….. has had a trance-like effect on policymakers, members of the military, and numerous other opinion makers." 27 Accordingly, Conservatives believe we should go back to our basics of conventional war fighting espoused under Powell Doctrine whereby the U.S. only commits forces to wars of the utmost importance to the nation, and only after ensuring overwhelming combat power. Furthermore, there is a concern by critics of the Patraeus Doctrine that nation building is quickly becoming the core function of the Army and that there are implications that the Army will transform into a light constabulary force intended for policing the world riddled with unstable nations. 28 Other scholars like Michael Mazarr warn that "redirecting U.S. military forces substantially toward asymmetric threats is misguided" due to the propensity decision makers to then get involved in conflicts that are counterproductive to the US that, in turn, would undermine the primary role of the US military of deterring and responding to major conventional threats. 29 However, Phillip Meilinger notes that common to both schools of thought, is an acknowledgement that military forces have "the tendency to regard battle as an end in itself, to see annihilation of the enemy as a desirable goal, and for military commanders to be blind, or at least naïve, to anything on a plane higher than the tactical level of war, is no longer viable." 30 The United States has discovered that, (according to Haass) when confronted with the decision to conduct major combat operations in a sovereign country, that "intervening too often poses an obvious danger. Any government indulging in what might be described as wanton uses of force would be guilty of acting irresponsibly, particularly toward those in uniform." 31 With our nations ongoing wars having entered the seven year mark, the country has quickly learned that that there is a price to pay whereby U.S. means are necessarily limited and that there will always be more interests to protect than resources to protect them. 32 The military, and the nation for that matter, are challenged to maintain a balance between the combat and stability roles played by the Department of Defense (DoD) in achieving national security objectives. 33 As a result, senior decision makers are left with making crucial decisions between these two competing camps. Therefore, it is increasingly important as DoD faces the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) beginning in 2009 under the shadow of pending budget cuts and it is up to the analytical community, in large measure, to help guide the decision makers resolving in with these important strategic questions. However, the analytical community as a whole has been undergoing its own challenges. In general, the community currently lacks many of the vetted tools and techniques in analysis of conventional warfighting for use in stability operations and Irregular Warfare areas.
Challenges with Current DoD Analytical Methods and Tools
With the advent and publication of DoD Directive (DoDD) 3000. James Clancy and Chuck Crossett expressed concern with current analytical methods when they wrote in Parameters, that "One worrisome consequence is that the decisions on which the United States bases equipment acquisition and constructs operational planning over the next decade are dependent upon traditional warfare-style analysis. Our tools, models, and even the methodologies for assessing success are biased toward measuring physical effects on near-peer forces, played out over the days or months of a maneuver and attrition campaign." 39 In addition, they point out that analysts are overcome by the overwhelming amounts of raw data, which given the lack of an analytical framework, makes them unable to interpret success or failure. An 'analytical framework' is best described, in scientific terms, as a conceptual system of definitions and classifications of associated data whereby the combination of a selected scheme (or methodology) of defining a problem/ along with a conceptual framework of related data may describe causality or association. 40 A good example of differing 'frameworks' is provided by Clancy and Crossett in which they describe the divergent opinions of 'technologists' over 'strategist' relating to the casualty of data associated with improvised explosive devices. While the technologists want to explain the changes in data is due to technology advances, the strategists or policy analyst, in contrast, want to explain the phenomena due to changes in friendly tactics and procedures, or perhaps changes in enemy behavior. 41 Furthermore, they rightly point out that the analytical community must learn how to measure and assess the effectiveness of insurgencies and IW, and if done within a framework such new MOEs may guide new models and simulations desired for future decision making. 42 Some analyst in the 'community' were initially aware of this shortcoming with the onset of 9/11 43 ; however, it would take some time before the analytical community as a collective body would start to understand and appreciate this deficit and work towards solving this apparent analytical capability gap. analysis of our enemy. 48 However, the realization of the true analytical challenges facing stability operations would not come until a year later. 49 It was then that the workshop members came to terms with their lack of skill sets and tools needed to answer questions that were never asked of them in the past or had been lost in past discussions. The workshop members broke down to sub groups and looked at simulation and models, metrics, and analytic support for SO. The group soon realized "a critical failing was that many agencies were conducting military, civilian, and multi-national analyses independently without cross-domain sharing of ideas and methods." 50 The collection of experienced analysts also discovered that metrics dealing with SO were unique for each operation, were difficult to define, and even more difficult to collect data on. Through self-discovery they also realized that the "culture of analysis"
for SO is different outside the military circles and declared that "that military operations research analysts should become more adept at analysis techniques used outside of traditional military operations research, especially for stability operations." 51 , and addressed in the 'quad chart' of the final QDR Report published one month prior to the workshop. 54 It was here that the analytical community came to terms that the "familiar physics-based existing suite of tools were not well suited to examine the capabilities of the Joint Force against new challenges." 55 The workshop, attended by some of the most senior ranking analysts from the services (the Joint Staff) OSD, set out to frame and then define five major challenges for the defense analytical community to work on. Of those, two pertained directly to IW and SO analytic advancements: 1) the development of analytical methodologies to assess and investigate non-traditional warfare and 2) developing a listing of the gaps in tools and methodologies for further development within the analytical research community. From the workshop report the group acknowledging that "when confronted with IW/GWOT, a purely physical science model for gaining insight begins to break down very quickly. This means we may have to admit that not everything falls into the category of things that are amenable to the approaches taken by the physical sciences. Secondly, we may need to manage risk associated with making decisions about processes that are not amenable to "scientific" methods." and simulations at varying degrees of fidelity in order to address IW/GWOT problems. In the workshop's concluding remarks, the collective body that was largely comprised of mathematicians, physicists, ORs, engineers and scientists acknowledged that they would "need to be augmented by other disciplines such as sociology, anthropology, regional experts, economy, political science, and psychology." 57 This was unprecedented for the time given the invisible wall between the 'hard' and 'soft' science fields.
By now it was clear that the analytical community was working hard towards solving some very difficult problems in addressing IW/GOWT implications in terms of strategy, force structure, manpower, and crucial acquisition decisions. But given the known constraints at that time (e.g. lack of analytical frameworks, models, data, etc.), the community fell short. As noted on the Government Accounting Office (GAO) report/investigation of the QDR. 58 The report identified three key shortfalls and all three were related to flaws in analysis. The first shortfall was the lack of "a comprehensive, integrated assessment of different options for organizing and sizing its forces to provide needed capabilities." 59 Second, they noted that "DOD did not provide a clear analytical basis for its conclusion that it had the appropriate number of personnel to meet current and projected demands." 60 The third shortfall also fell heavily on the analytical community given DoD did not develop the required tools to measure risk. Thus, the finding of the GAO was another wake-up call for the analytical community. However, in, the defense of the analytical community of DoD at large, they understood it would take years if not decades to develop the tools and methodologies needed. This was also apparent to the Army's analytical community which conducted their own independent assessment of their capabilities.
Challenges with Current Army Analytical Methods and Tools
In Analysis," looked at the Army's current capability gap in order to identify tactical and operational SO tasks and missions that Army could not conduct. 61 The study's findings, coupled with a sequential study conducted by the Army Center for Army Analysis (CAA) looking at capacity gaps for SO, was part of a larger Army effort to assess strategic capabilities and capacities to perform SO tasks in a number of different environments. 62 At the same time, TRAC started their own study entitled "Methodologies, Models, and
Simulations Research for the Analysis of Stability Operations" in order to determine working and usable models, methodologies, and simulations to support analysis of SO. 63 This later study was a clear indication that the Army was serious about looking at their analytical capabilities, or lack thereof, regarding SO. According to the report written by Kerry Lenninger, the studies were intended "to assess whether methodologies, models, and simulation (MM&S) provided appropriate functionality and utility over an analytic space representative of an Army corps and its divisions conducting stability operations in a Joint, interagency, and multinational environment …" 64 The final TRACFt. Leavenworth study was constrained due to limited responses from those surveyed and due to the fact the study group had limited experience and insight with the models and simulations recorded in the surveys. In addition, a full verification, validation, and accreditation (VV&A) was infeasible due to time and budget constraints. The study team was able to screen 30 MM&S during their research and, after receiving limited feedback, ended up evaluating/scoring 19 of them. The team then conducted a functionality appraisal of the methodologies, models, and simulation that was also limited by the lack of a contextual background or application (i.e. the team lacked an understanding of how the MM&S would be applied to a select set of problems). 65 The end result of the study was a good start for the Army, but was lacking completeness and devoid of a plan to move forward. In all, the TRAC leadership most likely understood they would need a more in-depth follow-on study that addressed the shortfalls in data and better understood the underlying science and accuracy of the models studied.
Lastly, the TRAC leadership understood the need to better pinpoint the analytical gaps in terms of IW and SO, and ensure the entire DoD analytical community was surveyed. plan in order to advance the analytical community if DoD regarding IW matters. 66 The study team comprised of analysts and IW Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) participating as either working teams, sponsors, advisors, and stakeholder reviewers from across all services, the joint staff, and OSD all worked collectively to get the analytical community moving forward. Though constrained by limited information due to sensitivities and propriety concerns, the study team did an extraordinary job in outlining a systematic (and traceable) approach to defining the problem and laying out an investment strategy.
They began by defining 160 varying 'decision issues' and then binned them into 14 decision issue categories ranging from 'battlespace awareness' to 'training'. 67 Similarly, the analyst defined 56 'analytic functional areas' necessary to address the question "What elements of the IW environment must the analysis account for to credibly answer the decision issues in this category?" and assessed each within a framework of the physical environment (terrain, infrastructure, local government, actors, etc.), friendly forces, and threat forces 68 Once compiled the study team cross-walked the 160 decision issues with the analytic function areas in order to validate their assessment framework and trace each framework to the decision issues. Meanwhile, a separate team compiled and investigated 23 identified MM&S across DoD that were related in at least one of the many aspects of IW.
Using this list of tools the study team then culled out analytical functional areas supported by existing tools and were left with a list of 35 analytic functional areas (later titled 'analytic capability gaps' in the study) that were either only partially supported by existing tools or, in many cases, not supported at all. Using a risk methodology of matching the severity of the gap against the probability of occurrence the team was able to identify the analytic capability gaps that ranged from extremely high risk or medium risk (as defined in FM 5-19, Composite Risk Management). 69 These risk results were surprising in terms of analytical gap impacts as related to the degree of impact across mission capability, readiness, combat power, etc. For example, of the 35 gaps, there were 34 gaps attributable to a lack of data with 17 of them falling in the highest risk category. Additionally, 20 of them were attributable to the "soft science" or behavioral field of science, and of these 14 were categorized in the highest risk level. 70 Doing a cost-benefit assessment of the 35 gaps, the team identified 17 as "High+" needing a "long term solution required that begins with fundamental research" and at a cost to exceed $1M or four professional staff years. 71 The cost-benefit analysis also identified five 'low-hanging fruit' analytic capability gaps relatively cheap in funding or man-years that were less or equal to $240K or 1 man-year.
In the final study's general findings and recommendation the team produced several topics that were worthy of further deliberation. The team concluded that "the best available solution to these gaps in the short term is through a human-in-the-loop The findings also acknowledged that though there was a substantial amount of resources from commercial, academic, and DoD sectors now focused on modeling the IW environment and "problem space", the efforts were not synchronized, consistent programs. Furthermore, in this 'best of breeds environment' there was no development of strategy let alone no reasonable way to validate or verify the models that exist or are currently under development. The recommendations made a genuine and valid petition for the Army senior leadership to (1) establish an Army enterprise data collection program, (2) institute a Senior Board to guide development of an IW assessment capability, (3) select a small set of the most promising IW models to grow and mature over time, (4) assign and resource a TRADOC organization responsible to provide authoritative human behavior data, and (5) utilize "wargame" methods, in the short term, to mitigate existing modeling gaps. 74 Although these recommendations are absolutely on target, they don't go far enough. there are yet additional measures that the analytic community as a whole must take to organize and plan for success.
Recommendations
The community can develop compelling analysis to convince the senior leadership that it must fully institutionalize stability operations, this may change. At a minimum, the community must provide the analytical rigor required for the senior leaders to evaluate force structure and operational options and pursue the best course for the Army and this nation.
Endnotes
